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When national oﬃcials are appointed to international administrations such as the European
Commission, how can we ensure that they act independently, rather than merely in the interest of
their own national government? Jarle Trondal, Zuzana Murdoch and Benny Geys present
ﬁndings from a survey of national oﬃcials who have been ‘seconded’ to the Commission for a
speciﬁc period of time. Their research shows that even though there should arguably be an
incentive for such individuals to retain loyalty to their national government, there is greater
attachment to the Commission than might be expected, particularly when national oﬃcials feel they
are being treated in the same manner as permanent Commission staﬀ.
National oﬃcials working in international bureaucracies such as the European Commission
regularly invoke the fear that member-states can strategically use such oﬃcials for inﬂuencing
decision-making to their advantage. In a recent study, we theoretically analyse the conditions under
which the autonomy of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become
compromised.
We base our research on a unique survey of 400 so called ‘Seconded National Experts’ (SNEs) in
the European Commission, who are individuals working at the national level (typically national civil
servants) that are ‘seconded’ to the Commission for a speciﬁc period of time. The dataset derives
from a web-based survey administered between January and April 2011 to all 1,098 of the
seconded national experts who were then active in the Commission.
National oﬃcials working in this capacity have time-limited contracts of a maximum of six years in
the Commission (or other EU institutions). Among Commission personnel, seconded national
experts represent the least likely case of autonomy since they have a double allegiance to the Commission and their
home organisation (where they retain their long-term organisational aﬃliation and which – except for additional
ﬁnancial allowances granted by the Commission – continues to pay their salaries). It is also generally assumed that
they will return to their home organisation after their secondment.
Gauging the autonomy of international bureaucracies
The two main aims of our research were to determine how we can account for the autonomy of national civil
servants working in an international bureaucracy (in this case the Commission), and to assess the extent to which
national civil servants working in the Commission are independent from member-state inﬂuence.
One central mechanism for explaining any lack of independence of national civil servants in international
bureaucracies is the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon. As the name suggests, this implies that individuals intending to
return to their home institution at the national level after working for the Commission face a strong incentive to avoid
fully discarding the expectations and aspirations of their home institution, since this might have important career
consequences upon their return. Yet, the implications of this revolving door might not be equal for all individuals, and
can be expected to depend on both the relations between national civil servants and their home and host
institutions, as well as the organisational similarities between the home and host institutions.
Our ﬁndings show that seconded national experts are, in practice, likely to be relatively independent from member-
state inﬂuence. The Chart below uses the results in our survey to illustrate the extent to which individuals profess
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attachment to the Commission or their home country. A score of 0 indicates that individuals display just as much
attachment to the Commission as to their country, a positive value shows they were more attached to the
Commission, and a negative value represents a stronger level of attachment to their country. The results clearly
indicate that seconded national experts are more likely to be attached to the Commission than their home country.
Chart: Autonomy of national civil servants working at the Commission from member-state inﬂuence
Note:
The
chart is
generated using two distinct questions. The ﬁrst question (indicated by ‘independence
representative’ in the chart) was: “In your daily work, to what extent do you feel you act as a
representative of the Commission/your country’s government?” This was asked twice (once
with the ‘Commission’ wording, once with the ‘country’s government’ wording) and the
diﬀerence between each of the scores is shown in the chart, where a positive value indicates
that attachment to the Commission was stronger than attachment to the individual’s national
government. The second question (marked as ‘policy proposal’) used the same system,
based on the following question: “When putting forward a proposal, how much emphasis do
you put on the best interests of the Commission/your home country?” For more information
on the calculations see the authors’ full study.
Overall, our ﬁndings provide only weak support for the ‘revolving door’ theory, whereby individuals who expect to
return to their home institution should lack autonomy from their national governments while working at the
Commission. More support is found for the notion that the lack of a clear structural disconnect between seconded
national experts and their two organisational aﬃliations undermines their autonomy. Speciﬁcally, individuals who
perceive their treatment to be equal to that of permanent Commission staﬀ act more strongly in line with
Commission-speciﬁc behaviours and roles than those who perceive themselves to be treated diﬀerently from
permanent staﬀ.
Finally, our data suggests that seconded national experts appointed from federal (rather than unitary) states profess
lower levels of national as well as Commission attachment. One tentative explanation for this is that our results
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reﬂect the importance of regional-level loyalties for oﬃcials from federal countries. For these oﬃcials, it might indeed
be regional inﬂuence that aﬀects their autonomy while working in an international organisation. Unfortunately, our
data do not allow us to pursue this in more detail, so this interpretation would require further substantiation in future
research.
Our research therefore suggests that national personnel contracted to international bureaucracies such as the
Commission are in practice largely integrated and committed to these international bureaucracies, and act fairly
independently from member-state governments. This is explained at least in part by characteristics of their home
institution (and country), their treatment within the international bureaucracy, and their contact patterns and post-
contract preferences.
For a longer discussion of this research, see the authors’ forthcoming article in the European Journal of Political
Research
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